4 an ontological perspective this means that, whether in the cases of personal, relational, communal, or cultural transformations, there is a metaphysical reality within which these transformations take place over time, so that the direction of these changes reflects a deeper transition that has taken place in reality.
In describing these elements of a successful and sustained transformation, then, we are indicating that there is an inherent necessity driving the transformation into being, and that this necessity is a felt need, a living option (in the sense of William James' use of the phrase) which is confirmed and consequently chosen by others as well because of their inter-subjective experience of that shared necessity for change. This is precisely where a transformative change requires more of a person and a group than any natural change, for birth, growth and death in living things may not be driven by an inter-subjectively confirmed and chosen necessity, even though these factors of life occur with a spontaneity that indicates that some other form of inherent necessity is at work.
Transformations are human and social affairs, they are socio-cultural powers which stand in contrast with social norms and private desires which move people within any one particular cultural-historical setting.
They carry within them a necessity for metamorphosis that provokes broad-ranging changes in the form and content of the lifestyles of those who experience their necessity, share in the burden of their call for change, and adopt creative actions that realize the new expression of culture by challenging and replacing older cultural forms and their accompanying content.
Having made these elements of the transformative dimension manifest, we should once more underscore the fact that not all transformations are effective, realized, or sustained. These occur because the socio-historical conditions of the desired cultural metamorphosis may hinder or even obstruct the change from being fully realized. For example, a visionary person who has the roles and perceived authority to announce change may initiate a cultural transformation, but if those whom she or he counts as supporters or followers are unwilling to take the same steps, even though they have confirmed the need for the transformation, the process will be stopped due to a lack of inter-subjective convictions that prevented its realization. On the other hand, if some followers are transformed but others are not, those who adopt the new order may end up living in tension with those who have remained within the former lifestyle and its social forms, or they create a new and wider synthetic whole that incorporates the not-yet-changed elements into their larger vision for a totally transformed culture. In this sense, their transformation is perhaps only partially successful, but they are aspiring toward the greater metamorphosis that their hopes and vision still maintain for the sake of future generations.
Within this account of the transformative dimension of culture there are assumptions about the very nature of culture itself, and so we need to address the nature of culture in a manner that will provide insight into this particular dimension of its expression. This is a philosophical concern because the term "culture" is used in a large variety of ways, sometimes intending to be a general concept relating to the common elements shared by a large group of people, and other times referring to something relatively special, refined, and even elitist in character, indicating the distinctive qualities of a group of highly trained and unusual persons. In this essay I am employing the term culture in a manner that reflects more of the former direction than the latter. Put more precisely, I consider the term "culture" to refer to "the dynamic and tensed time-space unity constituted by the values and institutions by which people live". 6 Because our experience of culture is vitally engaged both in the articulation of inner values within realized external institutions as well as the reassertion and reconstruction of those values as institutions develop over time, culture needs to be understood as a dynamic process of articulation and realization within the understandings of our shared pasts, our projected futures, our affirmed inward identities and the external values and institutions that challenge or even threaten our existence as a cultural whole. In this sense, cultural times and spaces are located in our historical recollections, our future projections, our inward affirmations, and our external rejections; they are united through our inter-subjective attempts to articulate and justify the values which matter to us, which constitute the very heart of our cultural identities, and solidified in our communal efforts to institutionalize these values by means considering the following account of his own understanding of reality. Arguing that the nature of reality is a "world-city" uniting Heaven and Earth and all beings (κοσμοπ óλιs or comopolis in his own terminology), the philosophical problem was to raise one's understanding from the state of a vulgar and ignorant person to that of a "soul that is rational, universal, and social".
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Consequently, while maintaining a cosmic awareness of the "fellowship of the universe" 25 where all heavenly and earthly beings were united, Aurelius was concurrently aware that philosophical understanding necessarily produced different classes of men and supported an elitist political structure. The interacting levels of reality were accessible only to the philosophically disciplined, and so required higher ethical duties of those whose rational souls had been awakened by stoical teachings.
Those who upheld this kind of "sincerity" would, in their due time, bear the fruit of philosophical peace. 26 This "higher Self" could be obtained only by "digging within"
one's own soul by means of philosophical disciplines. 27 To those without these disciplines and their rewards, the world and their own lives become bound up in selfish pursuits which irresponsibly set aside the rest of reality as something impenetrably mystifying. 28 Where there are parallels here to Zhang Zai's understanding of a dynamic cosmic framework which activates and situates all political praxis, the role of rationality's liberating power that manages everyday life by means of creative powers drawn from "on high" through whole person cultivation is not specifically emphasized. Instead, Zhang
Zai tends to emphasize moral practice over rational insight a the means to realizing one's role in this cosmopolis. In the end, both Aurelius and Zhang Zai accept that a person who cultivates this awareness of one's cosmic intimacy with all things will be able to "serve according to situations [as granted] while alive, and when one is no more, to experience peace".
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The transformative dimension manifest here involves not only the "vital organismic cosmology" that stretches "intimate authority" into a cosmic embrace as extensive as one can imagine, but also a factor that is left unaddressed by all Chinese commentators I have been able to consult. Very few delve into the emotional components that imply -as both the elderly Feng Youlan 馮友蘭 and more recently, Chung-ying Cheng 成中英, insightfully assert -that Zhang Zai intended this text to invoke a clear plan for ethical 13 action. 30 There is here not only a call for an orderly society based on a clear set of hierarchical structures, but also to embrace all kinds of neighbors as those who are needing one's care and attention, extending this also into environmental protection and concern about natural resources. This is certainly transformative. At this point that one senses Zhang Zai's challenge to his contemporary society: those who are physically disabled, diseased, or bereft of normal blood family ties are to be treated as one's own kin! Yet is was and is precisely these kind of people that at various times of history were stigmatized within Chinese society in general as the victims of cruel (and even deserving)
fates, who were considered unworthy of normal social interrelationship and were offered no place of dignity. So, even as Master Kong has pointed toward ethical transformations that were possible to consider but not acceptable in his own day, so
Zhang Zai in his Western Inscription is challenging the social norms and private values of his day.
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In this light it seems right that Feng Youlan qualifies these claims as "super-moral" (chao daode 超道德), elevating them to the highest intellectual-spiritual realm that he identifies within human experience: the intellectual-spiritual realm of Heaven and Earth (tiandi jingjie 天地境界).
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II. C. Sublated Personal-Cosmic or Religious Transformation
The use of the term "sublated" here is self-consciously borrowed from Hegel's concept of Aufhebung. Spurn sagacity and repudiate erudition, And the benefit to the people will be a hundredfold;
Spurn benevolence and repudiate righteousness, And the people will return to [their natural] filial piety and commiseration; . . . Manifest simplicity and embrace genuineness, Attenuate personal considerations and abate desires.
Comments made by Chen Guying 陳鼓應 confirm that we find in these phrases "a major divergence" in Daoist and Ruist accounts of following the Dao 道. 
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None of them were able to create the ideal world which they intended to achieve through their own revolutionary means, but all of them changed their age in ways that are culturally significant, and deserve further understanding. The situation is complicated enough that we need to address a number of factors that are clearly different in these various modern settings. For example, we need is to give some significant justifications and explanations for revealing why, after having passed through major revolutions, our cultures have continued to produce and spin-off different kinds of political and cultural life, including varying accounts of human rationality in and of itself. But let us reconsider these matters only after we have given a more thorough account of the nature of revolutions and their cultural significance.
One major theorist of "Western revolutions" was the German polymath, an 
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Having created his own influences in both Harvard University and Dartmouth College after leaving a Nazi-dominated Germany in the early 1930s, Rosenstock-Huessy sought to resolve several mysteries about these European revolutions before China went through its own. After his death in 1973, a former colleague at
Harvard and long-time admirer, George Allen Morgan, summed up insights gleaned from Rosenstock-Huessy's long-term interests and writings about revolution. Here below eight of his fourteen main claims regarding the nature of revolutions will be summarized.
These will be applied to aspects of the 1949 revolutionary Chinese situation, which Rosenstock-Huessy did not comment on because he had no means to study it in any thorough manner.
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What should be emphasized from the outset is that these claims were not meant to advocate a historicist determinism related to each and every revolution, so that there was no variety or no possibility of other nuances in these nationalized revolutionary experiences. On the contrary, what Rosenstock-Huessy sought to reveal were common patterns of human experiences stemming from within different national revolutions, and so by means of these insights could both capture shared dimensions of revolutionary experiences in terms of these patterns, while also indicating why their later self-reflective enlightenments would necessarily be different.
First of all, each revolution breaks out in the most backward country within a particular international setting which has been galvanized historically by some form of revolutionary ideology. This simple fact must be seen as ironic from a Marxist point of view, since it was not anticipated by Marx, who argued instead that revolution should first occur among the working classes within the most advanced capitalist settings.
Second, each revolution follows a pattern of development that proceeds in the following manner: provoked by a point of "cultural pressure" created by otherwise unresolveable tensions among the people within a nation, it moves through further stages of upheaval and arrogance, ending in a stage of humiliation. This is to say, the ideals motivating each revolution always fail to be realized, but reach a point of cultural transformation that both embodies its impact and rejects its extremism.
Thirdly, every revolution occurs during a period when a great cultural Angst takes over a nation, constituted by "the fearful sense that the old order has given up the ghost".
This anxiety is directly related to the particular history of that country and people, and so is a rejection which shapes the preferred form of rationality and enlightenment that the revolutionaries desire to instill within the new world they sought to realize.
As a consequence, each revolution seeks a different kind of freedom, a freedom "from something old and for the creation of a new order." There is therefore a "dialectic of revolutions whereby the oppressed in one stage are liberated in the next".
Rosenstock-Huessy goes on to claim that each revolution exports its particular contribution to revolutionized forms of life "most effectively during its period of humiliation, not during the initial upheaval". So, for example, one sees new forms of "soft power" that highlights distinctive cultural contributions which China's newly emerging capitalists prepare for international markets, yet all of these developments could only begin to be realized within the PRC during the post-Mao period.
Furthermore, all revolutions make claims that their revolutionary program is designed to change the whole of humanity, but in the end they "take root in a particular country and [so] shape the national character of that country". This is why a different kind of rationality will tend to predominate along with its special form of enlightenment in various countries which have experienced revolutions in different periods of world history. One would consequently expect to find postmodern deconstructionism predominating in contemporary France, while a democratic pragmatism would still weigh heavily in academic circles within the United States of America, and a concern for a higher harmony reached through the dialectics of theory and practice within the post-Mao years in the PRC.
Revolutions create distinctive institutions which continue to nurse the post-revolutionary character of a nation until it becomes effete "after several centuries of one-sided repetition". Among these institutions are the creation of new "holidays"
which "symbolize the respective revolutions", and a "new political language" which captures the energizing spirit of its revolutionary ideals. Afterwards, it requires "enrichment" by subsequent revolutions which "regenerate the stagnant older ones".
Finally, each revolution "has its own eschatology and leaves the preceding one behind". Mao's revolution started with a new vision of a world that could uphold the rights of farmer-peasants, and not those of the oppressed workers in the cities, as in the case of the earlier Russian revolution. This would also explain why there were needs to address hopes of the agrarian populace by land reforms and communes, making it so that each person would have something to eat and a place to live, even though the truly communistic society would not ever be achieved. Another area of recent development that is receiving some broad interest is the reassertion of a religious dimension with Ruist traditions by Chinese philosophers and others within "cultural China". 46 These discussions are not only stimulating new studies in Chinese philosophies of religion, but also raising interests created by inter-religious dialogues (Ruist-Christian, Ruist-Buddhist, and others) that even assert, following the creative reflections of Boston Confucians, that there could be room for a "multiple religious identity".
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This creative assertion has arisen because of intercultural transformations at work within philosophical and religious circles, and overcomes the artificially separated "ideal religious traditions" which have often been assumed within academic circles, sometimes appealing to the sociological framework articulated by Max
Weber. 48 Here, as in so many other cases where cultural transformations are at work, the standard academic norms of philosophical discourse do not indicate the actual dynamic nature of situations which allow for these developments; inter-cultural transformations are already at work within our inter-subjective speech-life long before we become self-conscious of their existential poignancy and their cultural importance.
III. Conclusion
The purpose of this article has been to highlight a dynamic realm of cultural experience that is described in a number of Chinese classical, pre-modern, and contemporary situations and texts. The transformative dimension in Chinese culture has been shown to be a realm of cultural reality in which the social norms and private desires of persons are changed due to necessities that emerge within the dynamic and tensed conditions of any one culture at a particular time. In this sense, we have argued that the recognition of the qualities and powers of the transformative dimension of reality is a key to explaining a number of interpretive problems within Chinese cultural settings, underscoring its value in providing insight into some inter-subjective experiences in 13 In this vein, Tao Jiang goes on to claim that in spite of the fact that ancient Ruist and Legalist traditions were opposed to each other, rule by law was ultimately "Confucianized" ("Intimate Authority", 37-42). In a volume attempting to address this problem from a larger diachronic perspective Yu Ronggen 俞榮根 straightforwardly asserts that the Ruist "law" (fa 法, which also suggests "imitation", "example" or "rule") 38 In this regard, the "American Revolution" stands apart because it was actually an anti-colonial war that took up certain revolutionary rhetoric, and so it might be considered a "semi-revolution" rather than a full-fledged one. 
